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PART III 
Adjective Law 
CHAPTER19 
Evidence 
WALTER H. MC LAUGHLIN, JR., and 
JOHN S. LEONARD 
A. COURT DECISIONS 
§19.1. Impeachment by evidence of conviction of crime. In 
Gilday v. Commonwealth! the petitioner was tried on a charge of 
armed robbery, and was convicted. At the trial the petitioner took 
the stand and testified on his own behalf. The Commonwealth in 
the course of cross-examination introduced five records of convictions 
to impeach the petitioner's credibility. In three of these five prior 
convictions the defendant was not represented by counsel.2 On direct 
appeal to the Supreme Judicial Court his conviction was affirmed.8 
Subsequently, Burgett v. Texas' was decided by the Supreme Court 
of the United States. In Burgett, the Court ruled that the introduc-
tion of records of prior convictions obtained without counsel in 
recidivist proceedings were constitutionally infirm under Gideon v. 
Wainwright, inherently prejudicial and inadmissible.1i Thereafter, 
a petition for writ of error was filed in the Gilday case, alleging as 
WALTElI. H. MCLAUGHLIN, JR" is a member of the firm of the McLaughlin 
Brothers, Boston, and an Instructor in Law at Boston University Law School. 
JOHN S. LEoNARD is a member of the firm of the McLaughlin Brothers, Boston. 
§19.l. 11969 Mass. Adv. Sh. 718, 247 N.E.2d !l96. 
11 These were a 1951 Ohio conviction for breaking and entering and larceny in 
the nighttime for which he was placed on probation: a 195!1 Minnesota conviction 
for carrying concealed weapons for which he received a sentence of !IO days: and a 
1954 Massachusetts conviction for assault and battery for which he was placed on 
probation. 
8 Commonwealth v. Bowlen, !lSI Mass. 655, 22!1 N.E.2d !l9l, cert. denied sub nom. 
GUday v. Mass., !lS9 U.s. 916, rehearing denied, !l89 U.s. 1010 (1967) . 
• !lS9 U.s. 109 (1967). 
Ii See People v. Coffey, 67 Cal. 2d 204, 4!1O P.2d 15, 60 Cal. Rptr. 457 (1967), 
wherein the Supreme Court of California reached the same conclusion. 
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error the admission of three records of convictions to impeach the 
petitioner's credibility as the convictions were obtained without his 
being represented by counsel. A hearing was conducted by a single 
justice who found that Gilday had no counsel and was impecunious 
at the time of each conviction. The Supreme Judicial Court was not 
in agreement as to the implications of the Burgett case with respect 
to the present issues but concluded in any event that the use of the 
not very serious records now attacked was "harmless beyond a reason-
able doubt" because there were admitted, without objection, two 
serious Massachusetts felony records. The Court added, however, 
that in view of the Burgett case no record of prior conviction hence-
forth should be offered to impeach credibility unless the witness thus 
attacked can be shown to have had or waived counsel on the proceed-
ings certified by the record. 
It is clear that the Burgett case did not decide the precise point 
relied upon by the petitioner for reversal. In Burgett, the prior con-
victions were an essential part of the offense for which the defendant 
was tried. They were introduced both to support guilt and enhance 
punishment, whereas in Gilday the prior convictions were used only 
to affect credibility. It is submitted that the Gilday case is indicative 
of both the Supreme Judicial Court's continuing lack of sympathy 
with the Supreme Court's pronouncements concerning criminal pro-
cedural law and its further use of the rescript as a procedural device 
to circumvent an analysis and discussion of recent Supreme Court 
opinions in the procedural criminal law area. 
In Della Jacova v. Widett,8 an action for malicious prosecution, 
the defendant introduced a certified copy of a conviction of the plain-
tiff as evidence of both probable cause and as evidence of plaintiff's 
character on the issue of mitigation of damages. The Court reaf-
firmed the traditional rule'f that proof of specific instances of bad 
conduct are not admissible for the purpose of showing character 
because the resulting delay and obfuscation of the central issues 
would far outweigh any benefits derived. The Court nevertheless 
admitted the prior conviction to impeach credibility. 
At this point a general reevaluation of the policy of impeachment 
81969 Mass. A(lv. Sh. 185, 244 N.E.2d 580. The case is particularly interesting in 
that the plaintiff was convicted of larceny in the Municipal Court of the City of 
Boston. The plaintiff appealed to the superior court and was acquitted. As a 
general rule a conviction in the tribunal to Which the complaint was made. even 
though reversed on appeal, is conclusive proof of probable cause. However, here 
the plaintiff alleged that the conviction was obtained solely by the false testimony 
of the defendant. The jury agr~ and rendered a substantial verdict for the plain-
tiff. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed irrespective of the fact that the testimony 
in the municipal court was not stenographically recorded or transcribed. The Court 
also stated that the superior court was obliged to analyze the, lower court's record 
to try to ascertain the basis upon which the municipal court convi~ion rested. See 
Broussard v. Great At!. Be Pac. Tea Co., 524 Mass. 525, 86 N.E.2d 459 (1949). 
'f Mdntire v. Levering, 148 Mas •• 546, 548, 20 N.E. 191, 192 (1889). 
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by,evidence of conviction of crime in Massachusetts is in order. In 
the Commonwealth, by statute, the conviction of a witness of a crime 
may be shown in a civil or criminal case to affect his credibility.8 The 
conviction may be for any type of crime9 and from any jurisdiction.1o 
It thereby is assumed that the reasons for excluding specific instances 
of conduct as a means of impeachment do not justify their exclusion 
when the evidence takes the form of a conviction of crime. Dangers 
of unfair prejudice, confusion of issues, misleading the jury, waste 
of time and surprise are supposed to disappear or diminish.ll The 
traditional safeguard against abuse is a limiting instruction to the 
jury that the defendant's criminal record may be considered only as 
it bears upon the weight given to his testimony. The value .of such 
a procedure has been justly characterized as sel~-deceptive12 and an 
unmitigated fiction18 which has as its only function the simplification 
of judicial administration by reducing the number of mistrials, new 
trials and reversals for prejudice.14 Moreover, there is an increasing 
realization that impeachment by evidence of conviction, particularly 
where the prior conviction does not involve crimen falsi, not only 
casts doubt upon credibility but may result in casting such an atmo-
sphere of aspersion and disrepute about the defendant as to convince 
the jury that he is a habitual lawbreaker who should be punished 
and confined for the general good of the community.ll1 
Numerous possible legislative solutions, a detailed examination 
of which is beyond the scope of this article, have received much com-
ment18 and merit serious consideration. Among them are: (1) Allow 
no impeachment by conviction when the witness is the aCCU$ed; (2) 
Allow only crimen falsi; (3) Exclude impeachment by conviction if 
the crime is similar to that for which the defendant is presently being 
tried; (4) Allow conviction evidence only if the accused first intra-
8 G.L; c. 2!1J, §21 • 
• See Gertz v. Fitchburg R.R., 1S7 Mass. 77 (1884), in which the defendant was 
allowed to impeach aedibility by introducing a conviction of the plaintiff for 
impenonating a revenue agent in an action of tort for personal injuries. 
10 Attorney General v. Pelletier, 240 Mass. 264, 1M N.E. 407 (1922). 
U S Wigmore, Evidence §979, 980 (lid ed. 1940); Advisory Committee', Notes, 
~ Draft Report of Proposed Rules of Evidence for the United States 
District Courts and Magistrates Rule 6'()9 (1969) (hereinafter cited as Proposed 
U.s. District Court Rules). 
12 Griswold, The Long View, 51 A.B.A.J. 1017, 1021 (1965). 
18 Kmlewitch v. United States, S!16 U.s. 440,455 (1949). See also Bruton v. United 
States, 591 U.S. 125, 128 (1968); Delli Paoli v. United States, 552 u.s. 252, 246-247 
(1957). 
1~ Comment, Other Crimes Evidence at Trial: Of Balancing and Other Matters, 
70 Yale LJ. 765 (1961). 
lIS Richards v. United States, 192 F.2d 602, 605 (D.C. Cir. 1951). See also Schaefer, 
Police Interrogation and the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 61 Nw. UoL 
Rev. 506, 512 (1966); Kalnen Be Zeisel, The American Jury 124, 126-1S0, 1,"-146 
(1966). 
18 Proposed U.s. District Court Rules at 126. 127. 
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duced ~vidence of character for truthfulness;I" (5) Leave the matter 
to the discretion of the trial judge.ls . 
While all of the above alternatives are imperfect, it is suggested 
that the most practical alternative is to leave the matter to the dis-
cretion of the trial judge. Since the Massachusetts statute is not writ..: 
ten in m.andatory terms, the trial court clearly is not required to aUo..,' 
impc!achment by prior conviction each time the defendant testifies 
on his own behalf. The experienced trial judge possesses an awareness 
and sensitivity which can be relied on to exclude such evidence where 
the prejudicial impact of impeachment outweighs the probative :rel-
evance of the conviction on the issue of credibility. The sound dis-
aetion of the trial judge lends the proper flexibility tempered by 
:reason and experience to properly balance the vital interests of the 
defendant and the public. 
Some judges of the superior court have already adopted the above 
approach in interpreting G.L., c. 233, §21. It is the opinion of the 
authors that the refusal of atrial judge to exercise his sound discre-
tion concerning the impeachment by evidence of conviction should 
be a proper basis for an appeal and reversal,1D 
§19.2. Leonard v. Taylor criticized and limited. In Common-
wealth v. MarchI the Supreme Judicial Court limited the effect of 
the long-standing rule :reaffimied in Leonard v. Taylor2 with respect 
to abninal cases and also implied that the Leonard v. Taylor ratio-
nale may rest on an unstable foundation in the civil cases. Taylor 
:restates the 109-year-old rule established in Clark v. Fletcher3 that 
whe~, a party at trial calls for a document from his opponent and 
receives and examines it, the document may be put in evidence by 
the opponent, even though it would have been incompetent if it had 
not been called for and etaniined. The primary rationale is that the 
holder of the document, after he complies with the demand for in-
spection, should be allowed to offer it into evidence to avoid any 
inference or evasion that a jury may draw from a failure to introduce 
the document. 
In Commonwealth v. Marsh, on voir dire it was established that 
the police oflker-witness had made notes. The defendant asked to 
see them. The judge ruled he might have them and inspect them but 
only under a formal demand. Such a demand, under the principle' 
reaffirmed in Taylor would have made the notes admissible on the 
offer of the Commonwealth. The defendant noted his exception and 
1'1 Uniform Rules of Evidence, Rule 21. 
18 Luck 'Y. United States, 3048 F.2d '163 (D.C. Cir. 1965). 
18 Cf. Jennings v. Rooney, 183 Mass. 577, 579, 67 N.E. 655, 666 (1903); Common-
wealth VI BelUno. 320 Mass. 635. 645, 71 N.E.2d 411, 418 (1947). 
fi19J!l .11968 Mast. Adv. Sh. 1229, 242 N.E.2d 545. 
2315 Mass. 580, 581, 53 N.E.2d 705 (1944). 
a 83 Mass. 53. 57 (1861). 
4
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law, Vol. 1969 [1969], Art. 22
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml/vol1969/iss1/22
§19.2 EVIDENCE 503 
argued on appeal that the Taylor rule should be confined to civil 
cases. 
The Court stated that the arguments for the rule noted in Taylor 
appeared inapplicable in a criminal case especially where the demand 
is on voir dire. The fact that there is no significant criminal pretrial 
discovery thus strengthens the case for allowing inspection;· 
The Court, however, held that there was no prejudicial error in 
denying the defendant the right to inspect the notes made by the 
witness after the Court examined the question and answers to which 
the notes may have been relevant. In future criminal cases, the Court 
noted, the judge should have discretion to permit inspection of notes 
without a formal demand. 
Significantly, the Court accepted as valid the traditional criticism 
of the rule by finding that it is an artificial distinction to allow inspec-
tion of notes used on the stand to refresh recollection and to decline 
it where the witness inspects his notes just before being called to the 
stand.1I 
It is evident that the Court went far beyond the necessary rationale 
for the decision. Since there is no significant criminal pre-trial dis-
covery in Massachusetts, the Court apparently feels that the penal 
nature of the present rule is an unfortunate remnant of an earlier 
era, the ,consequences of which should not be borne by a criminal 
defendant, particularly where his attorney is merely attempting to 
inform himself at trial, for the first time, of the nature of documen-
tary evidence being used against his client. In civil cases, however, 
with modem statutory procedures for discovery available, the demand-
ing party can, by skillfully utilizing his opportunities of discovery, 
completely circumvent the penal consequences of the rule.6 
In this regard, the liberal philosophy of Rule 15 of the Supreme 
Judicial Court Rules militates for the abolition of the Taylor rule. 
The purposes of Rule 15, to develop issues and to eliminate unfair 
surprise and concealment as litigation tactics, are completely inimical 
to the quaint common law notions of penalizing a party who attempts 
to ascertain the tenor of evidence in his opponent's possession, epito-
mized in the Taylor case. 
Therefore, having already established a substantial basis for the 
limitation of Taylor in the criminal law it is submitted that the Court, 
in further commenting on the substantial artificiality of the rule, 
is· possibly inferring that a similar limitation of the rule in the civil 
law is being given serious consideration. By placing the operation of 
the rule in the discretion of the trial judge, the Court would reduce 
much of the sportive element of the trial and eliminate the possibility 
• Citing People v. Riser, 47 Cal. 2d 566, 585 (1956). 
117 Wigmore, Evidence §2125 (M ed. 1940). Compare Hughes, Evidence, 29 Mass. 
Practice Series 205 (1961). 
6 See Rule 11:15, Supreme Judicial Court Rules. 
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of the acbniMibiUty of otherwise incompetent evidence. as well as Pf()-
viding the sufficient flexibility to prevent exhibitionism by an attor-
ney seeking to improperly influence the jury. The Marsh rationale 
ill persqasive. Its principle should be extended and applied in civil 
cases. 
§19.5.. Statem.entl to physicians and the doctrine of fresh com· 
plahlt. Though the Court rightly criticized the artificial distinctions 
forming. the basis for Leonard v. Taylor, the Court can be rightly 
questioned. concerning the scant veneer of Commonwealth v. Howard'! 
In Howard, the defendant was charged with unlawful carnal knowl-
edge and abuse of his seven-year-old daughter and incest. The moles-
tation allegedly occurred on the night of November 19, 1967, while 
the <=hil~'s mother was at work. The child saw her mother the next 
morning at breakfast before going to school. Normal conversation 
took pl;w;e and no complaint was made. The child returned home 
from school at 8 P.M. and since everything appeared normal, she 
went out to play.2 Finally, at 7 P.M. on November 20, 1967, the 
child told her mother what had occurred.8 The mother waited until 
the next day to call the police who in turn took the child to the hos-
pital for examination. At the trial the examining doctor was per-
mitted to testify as part of the medical history about the child's 
description to him of various acts of molestation by the defendant 
on qnspecified dates and that the "probable cause of the widening 
in the private area of thia little girl" was "a male organ penetration." 
Though he alflO testified that the opening was "slightly above normal 
:in size and not abnormal," he could not determine whether there 
had been any rec;ent abuse. Furthermore, based on his examination, 
he could not "say medically that intercourse took place at any time." 
The judge admitted the child's statements on the authority of 
Commonwealth v. Colangelo· that the statements were admissible 
as a basis for the physician's opinion upon the condition of her body. 
In his charge the judge instructed the jury that the child's complaints 
to the dQCtor could not be considered as evidence of guilt but only 
for the purpose of corroborating the child's own testimony about 
the defendant's acts. He also charged that if the complaints were not 
made witlUn a reasonable time, this would be considered as evidence 
tending to discredit her. 
The admission of the doctor's testimony raised two issues: (I) 
whether the history given to him by. the child was admissible and 
(2) whethCf his opinion concel1ling the physical widening could be 
based in part upon that history. The Court overruled the Colangelo 
~ but held that the doctor's testimony concerning the child's state-
ments to him about her father's conduct was admissible for the lim-
819.5. l. 1~ MaIL Mv. Sb. 485. 246 N.E.2d 419. 
2 R.ecord at 55. 
8 Record at 28-29. 51 • 
• 256 Mass. 165. 166-167. 152 N.E. 241. 242 (1926). 
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ited purpose of corroboration on the principle of "fresh complaint" 
by the child. The Court also stated that though the trial judge erred 
in not requiring the questions to the doctor to be in hypothetical 
form. such error was harmless because it was within the doctor's pro-
fessional competence to form an opinion whether the widening could 
have been caused by male penetration. The doctor's opinion that 
male penetration was the probable cause was rendered nonprejudicial 
by his expression of inability to say that intercourse had actually 
taken place, and also by his statement that the physical condition 
was not abnormal. 
Thus, the Court in overruling the Colangelo casell properly rec-
onciled conflicting decisions and reaffirmed the rule of the Roosa 
case8 that it is not competent for the physician to testify as to state-
ments by the patient concerning the cause of the symptoms or injury 
unless the statements are admissible upon other ground, such as a 
dying declaration.7 However, in justifying the doctor's testimony on 
the basis of the fresh complaint principleS the Court refused an op-
portunity to set down meaningful guidelines; rather, the Court merely 
stated that the complaints of the child were made as soon as could 
reasonably be expected in the case of a child of this age. Yet, the opin-
ion is devoid of evidence of the child being induced to silence by 
threat. Also, the child was not under the direct physical control of 
the defendant and was not among strangers or people in whom she 
could. not confide. The Court had the opportunity to rule that for 
the "fresh complaint" principle to apply the disclosure should be 
at the first suitable opportunity unless the delay can be justifiably 
excused. In refusing to limit "fresh complaint" the Court has con-
tinued to perpetuate an evanescent, dangerous principle wherein 
the corroborative effect of the testimony is far outweighed by the 
massive prejudicial impact upon the jury of the detailed statement 
of horrible abuse to the ravished related by the physician.9 
§19.4. Escobedo exclusionary rule inapplicable in civil cases. 
Although a confession obtained in violation of the rules established 
by the Supreme Court of the United States in the cases of E;scobedo 
v. Illinoisl and Miranda v. Arizona2 is inadmissible in criminal pro-
II In Colangelo, a physician's testimony that the victim stated that rape had 
taken place on a date six months earlier was held to be admissible as a basis for 
the physician's opinion, though not admissible as proof of the fact of intercourse. 
8 Roosa v. Boston Loan Co., 132 Mass. 4!!9, 24 N.E. 208 (1882). 
'1 Cf. Commonwealth v. Sinclair, 195 Mass. 100, 108, 80 N.E. 799, SOl (1907). Cf. 
Commonwealth v. Smith, 2lS Mass. 56!!, 565-566, 100 N.E. 1010, 1011 (1913). 
sSee Commonwealth v. Cleary, 172 Mass. 175,51 N.E. 746 (1898), where evidence 
of complaints by an outraged victim including all the details was admissible not 
as part of res gestae or as substantive evidence of the facts charged but merely 
for the purpose of confirming or corroborating the testimony of the victim. 
9 Hughes, Evidence, 19 Mass. Practice Series 565 n.!!7 (1961). 
119.4. 1 !!78 U.s. 478 (1964). 
2584 U.s. 486 (1966). 
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ceedings, the Supreme Judicial Court in Seelig v. Harvard Cooper-
ative Society3 refused to extend the above exclusionary rules to civil 
proceedings between private litigants. In Seelig, an action for mali-
cious prosecution and slander, the plaintiff had signed an incrim-
inating statement prior to being charged. He was later acquitted of 
larceny in the district court. The defendant in the malicious pros-
ecution action excepted to the trial court's ruling excluding the incrim-
inating statement because it was obtained in violation of the plaintiff's 
constitutional rights established in the Escobedo case. 
The Supreme Judicial Court held that even if the statement might 
not have been admissible against the plaintiff in a criminal proceeding 
due to possible violations of the Escobedo rationale, the Court would 
not extend these rules to civil proceeding. The Seelig result is sound. 
The purpose of the exclusionary rule is to encourage law enforcement 
officers to employ constitutionaIly valid procedures by preventing 
use of evidence at trial obtained in violation of a constitutional right 
of a criminal defendant. The evidence is not necessarily excluded 
because it lacks reliability, relevancy or probativeness. An extension 
of the exclusionary rule to civil actions would result in the examina-
tion of many witnesses and the determination of a multiplicity of 
sophisticated coIlateral issues on voir dire. The resulting delay, ex-
clusion of probative evidence and confusion of the central issues 
appear to far outweigh any possible prejudicial impact of voluntary 
incriminating statements of the plaintiff. 
B. STUDENT COMMENT 
§19.5. Insanity defense: Use of expert testimony:. Commonwealth 
v. Francis.1 The 21-year-old defendant, Francis, was tried before a 
jury for the murder of a female acquaintance whom he had been 
dating. On the evening of March 11, 1967, and the morning of March 
12, 1967, after having spent the afternoon of the 11th together, Fran-
cis and the deceased quarreled about her reputation and also about 
one of her former boyfriends. Francis, having become measurably 
upset during the quarrel, shot the girl and fled to Canada where he 
subsequently surrendered to the authorities. 
At the trial the defense pleaded notquilty by reason of insanity 
and called two qualified psychiatrists to testify on behalf of Francis. 
After establishing a substantial basis for their opinions, they stated 
that the defendant was suffering from a mental disease and, in terms 
of the test for criminal insanity in Massachusetts,2 the defendant 
31969 Mass. Adv. Sh. 489, 495, 246 N.E.2d 642, 647. 
§19.5. 1 1969 Mass. Adv. Sh. I, 248 N.E.2d 169. 
2" 'A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of such con-
duct as a result of mental disease or defect he lacks substantial capacity either to 
appreciate the criminality [wrongfulness] of his conduct or to conform his conduct 
to the requirements of law.''' Commonwealth v. McHoul, 852 Mass. 544, 546-547, 
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was not criminally responsible. The prosecution called the assistant 
medical director of Bridgewater State Hospital, Dr. Barrows, as a 
rebuttal witness. In his testimony, he re-emphasized the existence of 
a mental disease but stated that, in his opinion, the defendant did 
have substantial capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct 
and to conform his conduct to the requirements of law.3 On cross-
examination, Dr. Barrows contradicted his direct testimony and 
stated that due to the nature of the mental disease there was no way 
of knowing what defendant's capacity was at the time of the murder.4 
In effect, the testimony of the three psychiatrists was unanimous in 
finding that the defendant was indeed mentally ill, though it was 
somewhat contradictory as to the extent of that illness' effect on the 
defendant at the time of the crime. The jury, notwithstanding the 
expert testimony, found Francis guilty of first degree murder but 
recommended that the death penalty not be imposed. Francis was 
sentenced to life imprisonment. 
On appeal to the Supreme Judicial Court, the question presented 
was whether the verdict was consistent with the weight of the evidence. 
In affirming Francis' conviction, the Court indicated the factors to 
be weighed by the jury in its determination and HELD: It was for 
the jury to determine, on all the evidence, "whether what was done 
was itself evidence of insanity at the time of the act:'11 The Court 
also stated, taking note of other available evidence besides that of 
the experts, that this was "a good example of how the issue of insanity 
may now be properly tried."6 
It is precisely this last statement that is to be questioned through-
out this discussion. Was Francis, in fact, properly tried and was his 
case properly decided? At the outset, it is necessary to point out that 
it is not the purpose of this Comment to consider several related 
questions. It is accepted that in Massachusetts the determination of 
insanity is left to the jury.7 Furthermore, the validity and appro-
priateness of the Model Penal Code formulation as the adopted test 
of insanity in Massachusetts will not be questioned.8 Finally, it is 
not the purpose here to be concerned with the wisdom in choosing 
to plead the defense of insanity or the treatment a defendant might 
226 N.E.2d 556, 557-558 (1967), noted in 1967 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §9.l6. The 
psychiatrist, Dr. Mezer, testified in Francis that his diagnosis of the defendant was 
that he suffered from "Schizophrenia Reaction, Paranoid Type" and lacked sub-
stantial capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or conform his con-
duct to the requirements of law. Brief for Defendant at 15. 
8 Brief for Defendant at 18. 
4 Dr. Barrows' testimony, in part, was that "the substantial capacity may vary in 
this particular illness and it has varied in the seven months since we have seen 
him. • •• If it varies that much, it would be very difficult to determine just what 
his capacity was .•.• " Brief for Defendant at 18. 
II Commonwealth v. Francis, 1969 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 4, 243 N.E.2d at 172. 
6 Ibid. 
7 Commonwealth v. DeSalvo, 355 Mass. 476, 252 N.E.2d 921 (1968). 
8 Commonwealth v. McHoul, 352 Mass. at 555, 226 N .E.2d at 563. 
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receive in a penal institution versus a mental institution with regard 
to rehabilitation. 
If these policies and decisions are assumed to be valid, then what 
is wrong with the Francis decision? It is the thesis of this Comment 
that if the Francis case was in fact "properly decided," then first, the 
jury, which always has the responsibility of determining the question 
of insanity, may disregard the testimony of expert witnesses and make 
the decision based solely on their own observations and experience. 
Second, these observations may include a tendency toward social . 
obligation evoked by the facts of the case and result in a newly cre-
ated prejudice against the insanity defense. Finally, the jury's deci-
sion tends to be irreversible when evidence in addition to expert 
testimony is available. 
The value of expert testimony in this area can be discerned by 
considering the development of the Model Penal Code test and the 
reason for its adoption in Massachusetts. In a case where thft defendant 
pleads insanity, amoral value judgment must be transformed into 
legalistic terms to reflect the function of the legal system. In order 
that the jury make this determination based upon specific knowledge, 
the court allows the use of expert witnesses. In the past, however, 
there developed a dependence upon these psychiatrists' conclusions. 
Recently the courts have attempted to encourage the use of experts 
only as a means for· providing the basis for a judgment and not to 
allow the jury to rely on the conclusive opinion of the expert. How-
ever, the nature of the testimony elicited from an expert was in terms 
of the particular test of insanity in the jurisdiction. As a result, when 
the M'Naghten test,e for example, was applied, testimony was reo 
stricted so as to "prevent ..• the introduction of meaningful psychi-
atric testimony."lO The expert was, in effect, excluded from explaining 
the relation between the defendant's actions and his mental processes 
and was asked to make a judgment on his guilt or innocence - a 
black or white decision. The Durham test;l1 prescribed in other juris-
dictions, was restrictive on the jury also since now "application· >[ of] 
the test became medical rather than legal .... "12 
It was the purpose of the Model Penal Code formulation, adopted 
e The M'Naghten test provides that: "[T]o atablish a defence [sic] oil the ground 
of insanity, it must be clearly proved that, at the time of the committing of the 
act, the party aCCUlCd wu labouring under rilcb a defect of reason, from disease 
of the mind, as not to know the natul'e and quality of the act he was doing; or, 
if he did know it, that he did not know he was doing what was wrong." Daniel 
M'Naghten'. Case, 8 Eng. :Rep. 718, 722 (H.L 1848). 
10 "The medical expert is limited to testimony as to the accused', knowledge as 
to the nature and quality of his act." CoDDllent, The IJuanity Defense Under the 
Michigan Reviled Criminal Code, 14 Wayne L Rev. 865, 868 (1968). 
11 "[A]n accused is not criminally responsible if hi. unlawful act was the product 
of mental diIeaae or mental defect." Durham 'Y. United States, 214 i'.2d 862. 874-
875 (D.C. Cir. 1954). 
12 Comment, The IlI8anity Defense Under the Michigan Reviled Criminal Code, 
note 10 supra, at 874. 
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as the test for insanity in Massachusetts by the McHoul case,ll to over .. 
come these weaknesses. First the test was designed to allow greater 
use of expert testimony, that is, to allow the psychiatrist to testify on 
a broad scope in order to give the jury an essential basis for making 
a knowledgeable decision.u Secondly, this test recognizes that mental 
illness is a matter of degree and that even the most severely affected 
may know the difference between right and wrong . 
. . . The entire effort in formulating the Code was to recogqize 
that there are graduations of impairment of the capacity involved 
and to seek words that imply a greater depth in the mental ca-
pacity that is called for .... 11S 
Thirdly, "[t]he standard of substantial impairment will make psychi-
atric testimony more meaningful since evidence can be offered on 
several causes of the defendant's acts and the relevance of each cause 
to the conduct in question can be stated .... 18 Finally, attempt is made 
to avoid having the expert conclude as to existence of criminal re" 
sponsibility by allowing the jury to use its own experience and observa-
tions as a guide to making its determination.1'I' 
In short then, the purpose of the Model Penal Code formulation 
was to allow the jury more leeway in making a moral judgment. It 
need not rely solely on the conclusion of the experts, yet it was hoped 
that the jury would make use of the expert's broad explanations so 
that it could understand the mind of a mentally ill defendant. As a 
practical matter, the jury cannot be under the control of the court 
when it is allowed this leeway in its use of the expert testimony. In the 
Francis case, the jury may have completely discounted or even ignored 
the testimony of the three psychiatrists. It may have based its decision 
solely upon its observation of the defendant during the ,trial. Or, it 
may have looked at the act itself as the determining factor of defen-
dant's sanity. If the jury's conclusion was in fact a result of these 
considerations, then what the jury created was a standard of the 
normal man's reasonable reaction and compared that to the reaction 
of defendant. If it felt that defendant reacted as a normal man would 
have responded under the same circumstances, then the defendant 
was sane. 
This can be substantiated by the reaction of Judge Whittemore to 
the jury's handling of the decision. In dissenting to the Francis case, 
he stated that the jury misunderstood the significance of two facts 
when placed together: first, that the commission of the act was without 
provocation, and second, that the experts found Francis suffered from 
18 552 Mass. at 555, 226 N.E.2d at 565. 
i41967 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §9.16 at 166·167. 
lIS Id. at 162. 
18 Comment, The Insanity Defense Under the Michigan Revised Criminal Code, 
note 10 sUfn'a at 871. 
1'1 Comment, The Criminal Law Defense of Insanity in Massachusetts, 2 Portia 
L.J. 170, 176 (1966-1967). 
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a mental disease. To him these made the act of Francis "inexplicable 
if tested by normal conduct,"18 and therefore the jury was wrong in its 
decision. To emphasize Judge Whittemore's belief that the jury 
looked at the act itself, or the defendant himself, without use of other 
testimony, compare Commonwealth v. Ricard,19 in which Judge 
Whittemore, writing the majority opinion, affirms the jury's conviction 
of first degree murder under the same circumstances as the Francis 
case. In the Ricard case, the evidence established that the defendant, 
after being beaten in a barroom fight, returned to the scene with a 
gun and lay in wait for the victim whom he shot to death. The state 
psychiatrist was called by the defense and he conceded that defendant 
Ricard suffered from psychosis and paranoia, lacked substantial ca-
pacity to appreciate the criminality of his act, but stated that it was 
"possible" that at the time of the act, he was sane. The jury con-
victed Ricard in spite of that testimony. 
Judge Whittemore believed the jury was correct in rejecting the 
testimony of the experts. The reason for this must have been that the 
act of defendant Ricard was the response of a man sufficiently pro-
voked. In other words, according to Judge Whittemore, Ricard 
reacted as would a normal man, but to react as Francis did must have 
been the reaction of an insane man and thus the jury in Francis, mis-
applied the standards. While this result is understandable in terms of 
the relativeness of the provocation in the two cases, it does not explain 
the application by the jury of a "new test" for insanity. That test 
is whether the act of the defendant is explicable when tested by the 
standard of a normal man. Both Ricard and Francis had uncontested 
expert testimony that they were suffering from mental disease. But 
since the degree of insanity may vary, the jury looks at the act itself 
and how the defendant reacted to given stimulus. This seems to 
establish the fact that the jury applies a new test without making 
use of expert testimony. 
Why does a jury react in that manner? Why did the jury not find 
both defendants insane, or at least Francis? The reason might be 
explained by the jury's concept of the defense of insanity as a kind of 
"gamesmanship." This conception creates a prejudice against expert 
testimony associated with the insanity plea which develops subcon-
sciously in a juror during the course of the trial. 
One aspect of this prejudice is the belief by the jurors that insanity 
is a "popular defense," especially when a serious crime is charged.20 
They believe that the defendant is trying to take the easy way out to 
avoid criminal responsibility. They often feel that society is excusing 
"socially and morally delinquent behavior by labeling persons who 
engaged in such behavior as 'sick' "21 and, in doing so, is weakening 
18 Commonwealth v. Francia, 1969 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 5, 24lJ N.E.2d at 172. 
191969 Mass. Adv. Sh. 465, 246 N.E.2d 4lJlJ. 
80 It. Simon, The Jury and the Defense of Insanity 144 (1967), 
111 Ibid. 
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itself. The effect of this type of thinking is that the jury accepts it as 
"their responsibility to ,prevent any further extention of this social 
cancer"22 by rejecting the insanity defense. 
The second aspect of the "gamesmanship" problem is the awareness 
by.the jury of existing partisanship by the expert. Juries are aware of 
the adversary system, of the desire to "win" by each attorney, and 
therefore the feeling arises that the expert, paid by a particular "side" 
and testifying for its benefit, is part of that side. The expert is often 
identified with the particular position he takes by way of his diagnosis. 
This identification "can lead to subtle distortions, unwitting biases 
and warping of judgment. . . . [W]ithin the adversary system there is 
no such thing as impartial testimony."23 A further aspect of this par-
tiality of the expert is often thought of as the "Battle of the Experts." 
As part of the adversary system, each side may have experts testify to 
support their position with the common result of contradictory expert 
testimony. The jury must then decide whom to believe. Experts are 
not always equally competent, they are not equally objective, and they 
are not equally responsible or sympathetic to the goals of justice. "The 
psychiatrist's manner of presentation, his personality, and his cre-
dentials may have as much influence upon the jury as his scientific 
data. In this sense having a good psychiatrist becomes quite similar to 
having a good defense attomey."24 The resulting effect upon the jury 
is obvious; confusion and contradiction force the jury to either judge 
the competence and credibility of each expert or to reject it in toto 
and make its decision without the benefit of the experts' knowledge. 
This has a significant adverse effect on the defense because in almost 
all cases the defense is required to introduce the insanity plea. 
Solutions to this "gamesmanship" problem have often been sug-
gested. One would be to remove insanity from the question of guilt 
or innocence and have it pertain only to the disposition of the defen-
dant after a finding of guilty. This would remove the element of 
mens rea from a part of the criminal law and would therefore cause 
much revision in the law. A second possibility is that the court employ 
a panel of psychiatrists rather than either counsel hiring its own 
experts. This would tend to remove the adversary system from such 
cases, and also would take the decision making function from the jury 
and place it with the psychiatrists. A third suggestion might be to place 
the burden of examination with regard to sanity of the defendant 
in a capital case on the prosecution. General Laws, c. 123, §100A, 
provides for the making of such an examination and the filing of a 
report with the clerk of the court. It also provides that these reports 
will be available to the prosecutor. In no way, however, does it require 
22Id. at 146. 
23 Smith, The Ideal Use of Expert Testimony in Psychology, 6 Washburn L.J. 
500, 501·502 (1966-1967). 
24 Halleck, A Critique of Current Psychiatric Roles in the Legal Process, 1966 
Wis. L Rev. 579, 590 n.50. 
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the prosecutor ,to introduce the reports, nor must they be given any 
weight if introduced. As a result, cases like Francis and Ricard arise 
where examinations have been made by the state psychiatrists. The 
prosecutor leaves the introduction of psychiatric testimony to the 
defense which then provides the opportunity for the jury to react as 
described above. 
Another disadvantage to the defense when it pleads insanity results 
when it introduces technical evidence supporting the distinction be· 
tween mental illness and criminality. Stanley E. Willis II, a psychiatrist 
and author, comments upon the consequences to a defendant who tries 
to base his defense on such a separation: 
Neither term [mental illness or criminality] exists Without 
qualification; neither denotes absolutes. Undoubtedly, both terms 
require a social value judgment and this is a function of the 
particular culture or subculture which is seeking to protect its 
institutions. A group of jurymen should not be asked to decide 
whether a given assault on a social convention shall be classified 
as a crime or as a mental illness. It can be both, i.e., a crime which 
is the product of a mental ilIness. When pressed to decide whether 
it is either one or the other, they are likely to reach a finding 
that the behavior in question is a crime - which seems most 
consistent with preserving the social institutions. 'This is one 
reason the insanity defense is such a dangerous "game." Once 
the "game" of proving the insanity defense begins, ,the odds are 
fairly certain that the collective subconscious of the jury will 
be prejudiced against a finding that may seem to threaten estab-
lished norms of behavior.211 ' 
Willis illustrates this concept by comparing two situations which 
occurred simultaneously in the same state. One case was the Jad 
Ruby murder trial, and the second was the case of Vaschia Michael 
Bohan.28 The Ruby trial demonstrates the complexities of trying to 
separate criminality from mental illness. The defense attempted to 
show that the Kennedy assassination caused a passionate sense of 
revenge compelling Ruby to strike down the assassin. The trial drag~ 
ged on with a great array of psychiatrists of national reputation. In 
the end, the jury found that, according to the M'Naghteh test, Ruby 
was sane and then sentenced him to death. 
One and a half hours after Ruby shot Oswald, Bohan killed his 
stepfather who had verbally attacked the murdered K~ilnedy. Bohan 
pleaded guilty making no attempt to claim insanity. The judge, in 
passing sentence, commented that Bohan was apparently caught up 
in the passions following the national tragedy, fined him $1000 and 
211 Willis, Psychiatric Testimony, Trial Gamesmanship and the Defense of In· 
sanity, 5 San Diego L Rev. 52, 40 (1968). 
21 Both are umeported cateS and author Willi8, note 25 GU/Wa, Tdied to a great 
extent upon J. Kaplan and J. Wactz, The Trial of Jack lluby (1965). 
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sentenced him to eight years in prison. He then suspended the 
sentence and released Bohan. 
Both Ruby and Bohan reacted in the same way, yet in the two cases 
the results were inapposite. Willis explains this in the following 
manner: 
The differing results between the Ruby and Bohan trials 
turned on the effects of "adversarial gamesmanship." .•. But for 
certain automatic responses elicited when the consideration of 
mental illness and psychiatric testimony were introduced into 
the trial, a considerably different result would likely have ensued 
in the Ruby trial. It may have been that the jury feared they were 
being deceived .••• They decided the issue according to the rules 
of the "game," thereby ignoring or obscuring all other determi-
nants .... 
. . . When introduced into the Ruby trial as issues and positively 
asserted as theses, they [theories of insanity] inevitably evoked 
negative propositions. It is axiomatic that any weakness in the 
validity of a proposition positively asserted moves the trier of 
facts in the direction of doubt. This doubt seems particularly 
likely to insert itself when the jurors are not sufficiently sophis-
ticated to understand a complicated psychiatric or neurological 
phenomenon.27 . 
Willis further explains that a jury tends to identify with a defendant 
in a criminal case. They identify with the anger or frustration evoked 
in the defendant. But this identification and sympathy disappear 
when ,the defense attorney raises the defense of insanity and tries to 
prove the complex mental processes which influenced and motivated 
the defendant. At this point the jury's attention is focused on the 
attorney and not the defendant. The jury may then tend to "feel 
suspicious and fear that they are being manipulated with a trial 
tactic, or they may simply be hostile to the person who propounds the 
explanation and ,therefore reject it."28 
Another reason for the jury's negative response to the defense of 
insanity is the innate desire of each juror to protect society from the 
dangers these defendants present. Where the crime is of a violent or 
heinous nature, the jury wants to put the defendant where he will 
be kept longer and more securely. Yet jurors demonstrate a belief 
that a defendant needs medical treatment even though they want to 
confine him. 
They seemed to be searching for a compromise between the 
two verdict alternatives provided by the law - guilty or not 
guilty by reason of insanity. They were unwilling to find the 
27 Willis, Psychiatric Testimony, Trial Gamesmanship and The Defenle of In-
aanity, 5 San Diego .L Rev. at 45. 
28Id. at 46. 
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defendant not guilty by reason of insanity because they were too 
impressed both with the heinousness of the crime and with the 
rational, calculated manner in which, to their minds, the defen-
dant carried it out.29 
A final reason for the rejection of expert testimony is ,that the jury 
has formulated its own ideas on the symptoms of an insane man. 
These symptoms are "violence, irresponsible behavior, and an inability 
to carry out ordinary day-to-day activities .... 30 Consequently, when 
the jurors find that the defendant's reactions are similar to those of a 
normal man, that is, he is rational, methodical and consistent in his 
activities, they cannot convince themselves that he could be insane. 
Only if his acts were pointless and the result of. spontaneous emotional 
reaction could he be insane.S1 Often the jury will base its opinion on 
its own observations of the defendant at the trial. If the defendant 
is calm, detached, and respectful, then he is not so insane as to require 
a not guilty by reason of insanity verdict even where his crime has 
no basis in rationality.s2 The result, then, is to separate the defen-
dant's mental processes and internal conflicts from his external acts. 
In summary, the jurors tend to acquire a prejudice against the 
testimony of expert psychiatrists because they fear that the defense 
is trying to deceive them into letting the defendant off easy, and 
therefore they disbelieve an insanity defense. Since they do not 
comprehend the concepts of the psychiatrists they therefore give 
to their own observations more weight than they do to the knowledge 
of the defendant's mental processes as conveyed by the psychiatrists. 
They fear the danger this defendant presents to society and therefore 
demonstrate a desire to confine him. 
These considerations can now be applied to the Francis case for 
determination of whether that case was properly decided. First, the 
evidence tended to show a lack of provocation, that Francis' reaction 
was emotional and spontaneous, and that he "had to be insane to try 
it." Yet, the jury apparently felt that Francis knew what he was doing 
at the time and treated the act as a reaction completely separate from 
any mental process of the defendant which may have compelled 
Francis to react as he did. In effect, the jury gave no weight to the 
possible impact of these mental processes. Had the jury looked only 
at the act and at the mental processes as presented by the psychiatrists, 
the case would have been exactly like Commonwealth v. COX,88 where 
29 R:. Simon, The Jury and the Defense of Insanity 172 (1967). 
30 Id. at 148. 
SlId. at 150. 
82 Id. at 152. 
88 527 Mass. 609, 100 N.E.2d 14 (1951). In that case, the defendant crudely mur-
dered his wife, yet be calmly called the police to report it. He explained the act 
and his reasons for it intelligently and then signed a full confession. The only 
defense was the uncontradicted testimony of two psychiatrists stating that defendant 
was suffering from a mental disease. Appellant's argument was that, as a matter 
of law, thil uncontradicted testimony required a directed verdict of not guilty by 
16
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law, Vol. 1969 [1969], Art. 22
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml/vol1969/iss1/22
§19.5 EVIDENCE 515 
the Supreme Judicial Court reversed the jury's conviction as against 
the weight of the evidence which consisted only of uncontradicated 
expert testimony. The cases are distinguishable according to Francis, 
because in Francis "the jury had much before them on the activity of 
the defendant before and after the crime, as well as the opportunity 
to see and hear him on the I stand."34 This is precisely the point; 
the presence of evidence in addition to the expert's testimony provided 
the jury with sufficient leeway to base its decision on any factors or 
tests other than the defendant's mental state. 
For example, Francis took the stand and. testified at length. He 
appeared calm and detached with no patent evidence of insanity. 
From testimony of the arresting police officers there was no sign of 
abnormal behavior by defendant from the time of his arrest. Further-
more, there was evidence that his actions before and after the crime 
were rational, methodical and consistent. These factors enabled the 
jury to convince itself that insanity was merely a sham defense. 
Secondly, the act itself was violent, and being spontaneous, indicates 
the dangerousness of Francis. Therefore the jury could have had the 
desire to protect society from him. The jurors could have felt it was 
best for all concerned, considering the lack of difference between a 
penal and mental institution with regard to degree of treatment, that 
Francis be put in prison while noting his need for psychiatric atten-
tion. 
Similarly, in the Ricard case, the defendant was methodical, rational, 
coherent, revengeful and dangerous - all attributes which lend them-
selves to the consideration discussed above. 
In the Cox case, the Court had evidence which clearly proved that 
the murder by Cox of his wife was committed deliberately and with 
premeditated malice aforethought. The only defense was two expert 
psychiatrists who had examined Cox in accordance with G.L., c. 123, 
§IOOA, and had testified that he was insane. In both Francis and Cox 
there was unanimous medical opinion that both defendants were 
insane and yet the juries convicted each. The distinction which Francis 
mentions is the fact that in Francis the defendant testified while in 
Cox there was no such observation available to the jury. The only 
evidence before the jury was the testimony concerning the act of the 
murder and the expert testimony. The result might have been dif-
ferent had Francis not taken the stand or if he had acted less calm 
and detached. If may even be said that Francis convicted himself 
when he appeared on the witness stand. 
It is significant that even though it is recognized that the question 
of insanity is for the jury, the Cox decision was not affirmed, yet the 
reason of insanity. The Court disagreed but ordered a new trial because the ver· 
dict was against the weight of the evidence. The Court said that since the only 
issue was criminal responsibility, and since the only evidence for the prosecution 
was the presumption that all men are sane, this was not enough to overcome the 
defense evidence. 
3'1969 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 4, 245 N.E.2d at 172. 
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FTancis and RicaTd decisions were. It is submitted that as a result of 
these two most recent decisions, when the insanity defense is raised, 
as long as there exists evidence other than expert testimony, the jury's 
conviction will be irreversible. 
If these are accurate observations of the nature of the· response the 
insanity defense evokes from the jurors, then what can or should an 
attorney do to protect his client? It is the duty of the defense attorney 
to convince the jury that their decision must depend on their under-
standing of the trial, their own sense of justice, and their own concept 
of moral responsibility. He must then convince the court that if the 
jury is to retain its objectivity in performing its function, the court 
must acknowledge the possibility of prejudice arising against the 
insanity defense. He must make the court aware of the jury's tendency 
to disregard significant testimony and to establish a test of insanity of 
its own. He must also convince the court that a jury often miscon-
strues a defense attorney's attempt to be convincing as an attempt 
to take advantage of a "gullible" jury. However, this is not an easy 
task. The manner. in . which the attorney addresses himself to this 
problem may be detrimental if the jury believes that this also is a part 
of the ploy. 
Some suggestions, if adopted by the court, could relieve the defense 
of some degree of prejudice. One would be to require the prosecution 
to introduce in court the reports of the psychiatrists who examined 
the defendant in accordance with G.L., c. 125, §lOOA. A second would 
be to request that the trial judge instruct the jury to be aware of the 
subconscious creation of prejudicie which often develops in an insanity 
defense case. And third, the defense attorney might request the court 
to re-emphasize the responsibility of a jury to make its determination, 
keeping the ends of justice clearly in mind. 
ARTHUR PRICE 
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